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ABSTRACT
High scalability and low running costs have made fuzz testing the
de facto standard for discovering software bugs. Fuzzing techniques
are constantly being improved in a race to build the ultimate bug-
finding tool. However, while fuzzing excels at finding bugs in the
wild, evaluating and comparing fuzzer performance is challenging
due to the lack of metrics and benchmarks. For example, crash
count—perhaps the most commonly-used performance metric—
is inaccurate due to imperfections in deduplication techniques.
Additionally, the lack of a unified set of targets results in ad hoc
evaluations that hinder fair comparison.
We tackle these problems by developing Magma, a ground-truth
fuzzing benchmark that enables uniform fuzzer evaluation and com-
parison. By introducing real bugs into real software, Magma allows
for the realistic evaluation of fuzzers against a broad set of targets.
By instrumenting these bugs, Magma also enables the collection of
bug-centric performance metrics independent of the fuzzer. Magma
is an open benchmark consisting of seven targets that perform a va-
riety of input manipulations and complex computations, presenting
a challenge to state-of-the-art fuzzers.
We evaluate six widely-used mutation-based greybox fuzzers
(AFL, AFLFast, AFL++, FairFuzz,MOpt-AFL, and honggfuzz) against
Magma over 200 000CPU-hours. Based on the number of bugs,
reached, triggered, and detected, we draw conclusions about the
fuzzers’ exploration and detection capabilities. This provides insight
into fuzzer performance evaluation, highlighting the importance of
ground truth in performing more accurate and meaningful evalua-
tions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Fuzz testing (“fuzzing”) is a widely-used dynamic bug discovery
technique. It involves generating a large number of inputs and sub-
jecting a target program to these inputs with the aim of triggering
a fault (i.e., discovering a bug). Fuzzing is an inherently sound but
incomplete bug-finding process (given finite resources). In particu-
lar, state-of-the-art fuzzers rely on crashes to mark faulty program
behavior. The existence of a crash is generally symptomatic of a
bug (soundness), but the lack of a crash does not necessarily mean
that the program is bug-free (incompleteness). Fuzzing has been
wildly successful in finding thousands of bugs in open-source [3]
and commercial off-the-shelf [5, 6, 44] software.
The success of fuzzing has resulted in an explosion of new
techniques claiming to improve bug-finding performance [34]. In
order to highlight improvements, these techniques are typically
evaluated across a range of metrics, including: (i) crash counts;
(ii) ground-truth bug counts; and/or (iii) code-coverage profiles.
While these metrics provide some insight into a fuzzer’s perfor-
mance, we argue that they are insufficient for use in fuzzer compar-
isons. Furthermore, the set of target programs that these metrics
are evaluated on can vary wildly across papers, making cross-paper
comparisons impossible. The deficiencies of these three metrics are
discussed in turn.
Crash counts. The simplest method for evaluating a fuzzer is
to count the number of crashes triggered by that fuzzer, and com-
pare this crash count with that achieved by another fuzzer on the
same target program. Unfortunately, crash counts often inflate the
number of actual bugs in the target program [29]. Moreover, dedu-
plication techniques (e.g., coverage profiles, stack hashes) fail to
accurately identify the root cause of these crashes [9, 29].
Bug counts. Identifying a crash’s root cause is preferable to simply
reporting raw crashes, as it avoids the inflation problem inherent
in crash counts. Unfortunately, obtaining an accurate ground-truth
bug count typically requires extensive manual triage, which in
turn requires someone with extensive domain expertise and experi-
ence [1].
Code-coverage profiles. Due to the difficulty in obtaining ground-
truth bug counts, code-coverage profiles are another performance
metric commonly used to evaluate and compare fuzzing techniques.
Intuitively, covering more code correlates with finding more bugs.
However, previous work [29] has shown that there is a weak cor-
relation between coverage-deduplicated crashes and ground-truth
bugs, implying that higher coverage does not necessarily indicate
better fuzzer effectiveness.
The deficiencies of existing performance metrics calls for a re-
think of fuzzer evaluation practices. In particular, the performance
metrics used in these evaluationsmust accuratelymeasure a fuzzer’s
ability to achieve its main objective: finding bugs. Similarly, the tar-
get programs that are used to assess how well a fuzzer meets this
objectivemust be realistic and exercise diverse behavior. This allows
a practitioner to have confidence that a given fuzzing technique will
yield improvements when deployed in real-world environments.
To satisfy these criteria, we present Magma, a ground-truth
fuzzer benchmark based on real programs with real bugs. Magma
consists of seven widely-used open-source libraries and applica-
tions, totalling 2MLOC. For each Magma workload, we manually
analyze security-relevant bug reports and patches, reinserting de-
fective code back into these seven libraries and applications (in
total, 118 bugs were analyzed and reinserted). Additionally, each
reinserted bug is accompanied by an oracle that detects and reports
if the bug is reached or triggered. This distinction between reaching
and triggering a bug—in addition to a fuzzer’s ability to detect a
triggered bug—presents a new opportunity to evaluate a fuzzer
across multiple dimensions (again, focusing on ground-truth bugs).
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The remainder of this paper presents the motivation behind
Magma, the methodology behindMagma’s design and choice of per-
formance metrics, implementation details, and a set of preliminary
results that demonstrate Magma’s utility. We make the following
contributions:
• A set of bug-centric performance metrics that should be
measurable in a fuzzer benchmark, allowing for a fair and
accurate evaluation and comparison of fuzzers.
• A methodology for selecting workloads (both targets and
bugs) in a fuzzing benchmark.
• The design and implementation of Magma, a ground-truth
fuzzing benchmark based on real programs with real bugs.
• An evaluation of Magma against six widely-used fuzzers.
Magma is open-source and available from https://hexhive.epfl.
ch/magma.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
This section introduces fuzzing as a software testing technique, and
how new fuzzing techniques are currently evaluated and compared
against existing ones. This aims to motivate the need for new fuzzer
evaluation practices.
2.1 Fuzzing
A fuzzer is a dynamic analysis tool that discovers software flaws
by running a target program with a large number of automatically-
generated inputs. Notably, these inputs are generated with the
intention of triggering a crash in the target program. This input
generation process is dependent on a fuzzer’s knowledge of the
target’s input format and program structure.
For example, grammar-based fuzzers (e.g., Superion [55], Peach-
fuzz [37], and QuickFuzz [21]) leverage the target program’s input
format (which must be specified a priori) to intelligently craft inputs
(e.g., based on data width and type, and on the relationships between
different input fields). In contrast,mutational fuzzers (e.g., AFL [58],
Angora [12], and MemFuzz [13]) require no a priori knowledge
of the input format. Instead, mutational fuzzers leverage prepro-
grammed mutation operations to iteratively modify the input.
Fuzzers are also classified by their knowledge of the target’s pro-
gram structure. For example, whitebox fuzzers [16, 17, 41] leverage
program analysis to infer knowledge about the program structure.
In comparison, blackbox fuzzers [4, 56] blindly generate inputs in
the hope of discovering a crash. Finally, greybox fuzzers [12, 31, 58]
leverage program instrumentation (instead of program analysis) to
collect runtime information. Program-structure knowledge guides
input generation in a manner more likely to trigger a crash.
Importantly, fuzzing is a highly stochastic bug-finding process.
This statement remains true irrespective of whether the fuzzer
synthesizes inputs from a grammar (grammar-based fuzzing), trans-
forms an existing set of inputs to arrive at new inputs (mutational
fuzzing), has no knowledge of that target program’s internals (black-
box fuzzing), or uses sophisticated program analyses to understand
the target program (whitebox fuzzing). This inherent randomness
makes evaluating and comparing fuzzers difficult. This problem is
exacerbated by existing fuzzer evaluation metrics and benchmarks.
2.2 The Current State of Fuzzer Evaluation
The rapid emergence of new and improved fuzzing techniques [34]
means that fuzzers are constantly compared against one another, in
order to empirically demonstrate that the latest fuzzer supersedes
previous state-of-the-art fuzzers. To enable fair and accurate fuzzer
evaluation, it is critical that fuzzing campaigns are conducted on a
suitable benchmark that uses an appropriate set of metrics. Unfor-
tunately, fuzzer evaluations have so far been ad hoc and haphazard.
For example, Klees et al.’s study of 32 fuzzing papers found that none
of the surveyed papers provided sufficient detail to support their
claims of fuzzer improvement [29]. Notably, their study highlights
a set of criteria that should be adopted across all fuzzer evaluations.
These criteria include:
Performance metrics: How the fuzzers are evaluated and com-
pared. This is typically one of the approaches previously
discussed (crash count, bug count, or coverage profiling).
Targets: The software being fuzzed. Fuzzers should be evaluated
on diverse, realistic workloads.
Seed selection: The initial set of inputs that bootstrap the fuzzing
process. This initial set of inputs should be consistent across
repeated trials and the fuzzers under evaluation.
Trial duration (timeout): The length of a single fuzzing trial
should also be consistent across repeated trials and the fuzzers
under evaluation.We use the term trial to refer to an instance
of the fuzzing process on a target program, while a fuzzing
campaign is a set of N repeated trials on the same target
program.
Number of trials: The highly-stochastic nature of fuzzing neces-
sitates a large number of repeated trials, allowing for a sta-
tistically sound comparison of results.
Klees et al.’s study demonstrates the need for a ground-truth
fuzzing benchmark. Such a benchmark must use suitable perfor-
mance metrics and present a unified set of target programs.
2.2.1 Existing Fuzzer Benchmarks. Fuzzers are typically evaluated
on a set of target programs sourced from one of the following
benchmarks. These benchmarks are summarized in Table 1.
The LAVA-M [14] test suite aims to evaluate the effectiveness
of a fuzzer’s exploration capability by injecting bugs in different
execution paths. However, the LAVA bug injection technique only
injects a single, simple bug type: an out-of-bounds memory ac-
cess triggered by a “magic value” comparison. This bug type does
not accurately represent the statefulness and complexity of bugs
encountered in real-world software.
In contrast, the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) [11] sample set
provides a wider variety of bugs that are suitable for testing a
fuzzer’s fault detection capabilities. Unfortunately, the relatively
small size and simplicity of the CGC’s synthetic workloads does
not enable thorough evaluation of the fuzzer’s ability to explore
complex programs.
BugBench [32] and the Google Fuzzer Test Suite (FTS) [19] both
contain real programswith real bugs. However, each target program
only contains one or two bugs (on average). This sparsity of bugs,
combined with the lack of automatic methods for triaging crashes,
hinders adoption and makes both benchmarks unsuitable for fuzzer
evaluation. In contrast, Google FuzzBench [18]—the successor to
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Table 1: A summary of existing fuzzer benchmarks and our benchmark, Magma. We characterize benchmarks across two
dimensions: the target programs that make up the benchmark workloads and the bugs that exist across these workloads.
For both dimensions we count the number of workloads/bugs (#) and classify them as Real or Synthetic. Bug density is the
mean number of bugs per workload. Finally, ground truth may be available (✓), available but not easily accessible (◗), or
unavailable (✗).
Benchmark Workloads Bugs Bug Density Ground truth# Real/Synthetic # Real/Synthetic
LAVA-M [14] 4 R 2265 S 566.25 ✓
CGC [11] 131 S 590 S 4.50 ◗
BugBench [32] 17 R 19 R 1.12 ◗
Google FTS [19] 24 R 47 R 1.96 ◗
Google FuzzBench [18] 21 R − − − −
Open-source software − R ? R ? ✗
Magma 7 R 118 R 16.86 ✓
the Google FTS—is a fuzzer evaluation platform that relies solely on
coverage profiles as a performance metric. As previously discussed,
this metric has severe limitations when evaluating fuzzers on their
bug-finding capability.
Finally, popular open-source software (OSS) is often used to eval-
uate fuzzers [10, 29, 30, 33, 38, 54]. Although real-world software
is used, the lack of ground-truth knowledge about the triggered
crashes makes it difficult to provide an accurate, verifiable, quanti-
tative evaluation. Furthermore, it is often unclear which software
version is used, making fair cross-paper comparisons impossible.
2.2.2 Crashes as a Performance Metric. Most, if not all, state-of-the-
art fuzzers implement fault detection as a crash listener. A program
crash can be caused by an architectural violation (e.g., division-
by-zero, unmapped/unprivileged page access) or by a sanitizer (a
dynamic bug-finding tool that generates a crash when a security
policy violation—e.g., object out-of-bounds, type safety violation—
occurs [48]).
The simplicity of crash detection has led to the widespread use
of crash count as a performance metric for comparing fuzzers. How-
ever, crash counts have been shown to yield inflated results, even
when combined with deduplication methods (e.g., coverage pro-
files and stack hashes) [9, 29]. Instead, the number of bugs found
by each fuzzer can be compared: if fuzzer A finds more bugs than
fuzzer B, then A is superior to B. Unfortunately, there is no single
formal definition for a bug. Defining a bug in its proper context is
best achieved by formally modeling program behavior. However,
deriving formal program models is a difficult and time-consuming
task. As such, bug detection techniques tend to create a blacklist of
faulty behavior, mislabeling or overlooking some classes of bugs in
the process. This often leads to incomplete detection of bugs and
root-cause misidentification, resulting in a duplication of crashes
and an inflated set of results.
3 DESIRED BENCHMARK PROPERTIES
Benchmarks are important drivers for computer science research
and product development [8]. Several factors must be taken into
account when designing a benchmark, including: relevance; re-
producibility; fairness; verifiability; and usability [2, 52]. While
building benchmarks around these properties is well studied [2, 8,
24, 28, 32, 43, 45, 50, 52], the highly-stochastic nature of fuzzing
introduces new challenges for benchmark designers.
For example, reproducibility is a key benchmark property that
ensures a benchmark produces “the same results consistently for a
particular test environment” [52]. However, individual fuzzing trials
vary wildly in performance, requiring a large number of repeated
trials for a particular test environment [29]. While performance
variance exists in most benchmarks (e.g., the SPEC CPU bench-
mark [50] uses the median of three repeated trials to account for
small variations across environments), this variance is far greater
in fuzzing. Furthermore, a fuzzer may actively modify the test envi-
ronment (e.g., T-Fuzz [38] and FuzzGen [26] transform the target
program, while Skyfire [54] generates new seed inputs for the tar-
get). This is very different to traditional performance benchmarks
(e.g., SPEC CPU [50], DaCapo [8]), where the workloads and their
inputs remain fixed across all systems-under-test (SUT).
This leads us to define the following set of properties that we
argue must exist in a fuzzing benchmark:
Diversity (P1): The benchmark contains a wide variety of bugs
and programs that resemble real software testing scenarios.
Verifiability (P2): The benchmark yields verifiable metrics that
accurately describe performance.
Usability (P3): The benchmark is accessible and has no significant
barriers for adoption.
These three properties are explored in the following sections, while
Section 4 describes how Magma satisfies these criteria.
3.1 Diversity (P1)
Fuzzers are actively used to find bugs in a variety of real programs [3,
5, 6, 44]. Therefore, a fuzzing benchmark must evaluate fuzzers
against programs and bugs that resemble those encountered in the
“real world”. To this end, a benchmark must include a diverse set of
bugs and programs.
Bugs should be diverse with respect to:
Class: CommonWeakness Enumeration (CWE) [36] bug classes in-
clude memory-based errors, type errors, concurrency issues,
and numeric errors.
Distribution: “Depth”, fan-in (i.e, the number of paths which exe-
cute the bug), and spread (i.e., the ratio of faulty-path counts
to the total number of paths).
Complexity: Number of input bytes involved in triggering a bug,
the range of input values which triggers the bug, and the
transformations performed on the input.
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Similarly, programs (i.e, the benchmark workloads) should be
diverse with respect to:
Application domain: File and media processing, network proto-
cols, document parsing, cryptography primitives, and data
encoding.
Operations performed: Parsing, checksum calculation, indirec-
tion, transformation, state management, and data validation.
Input structure: Binary, text, formats/grammars, and data size.
Satisfying this property requires bugs that resemble those en-
countered in real-world environments. Both LAVA-M and Google
FuzzBench fail this requirement: the former contains only a sin-
gle bug class (an out-of-bounds memory access), while FuzzBench
does not measure for any bugs. However, both Google FTS and
FuzzBench contain workloads from a wide variety of application do-
mains, including cryptography, image parsing, text processing, and
compilers. Finally, BugBench primarily focuses on memory corrup-
tion vulnerabilities, but also contains uninitialized read, memory
leak, data race, atomicity, and semantic bugs (for a total of nine bug
classes).
Ultimately, real programs are the only source of real bugs. There-
fore, a benchmark designed to evaluate fuzzers must include real
programs with a variety of real bugs, thus ensuring diversity and
avoiding bias (e.g., towards a specific bug class). Whereas discov-
ering and reporting real bugs is desirable (i.e, when OSS is used),
performance metrics based on an unknown set of bugs (with an
unknown distribution) make it impossible to compare fuzzers. In-
stead, fuzzers should be evaluated on workloads containing known
bugs for which ground truth is available and verifiable.
3.2 Verifiability (P2)
Existing ground-truth fuzzing benchmarks lack a straightforward
mechanism for determining a crash’s root cause. This makes it diffi-
cult to verify a fuzzer’s results. Crash count, the current widely-used
performance metric, suffers from high variability, double-counting,
and inconsistent results across multiple trials (see Section 2.2.2).
Automated techniques for deduplicating crashes are not reliable,
and hence should not be used to verify the bugs discovered by a
fuzzer. Ultimately, a fuzzing benchmark should provide a set of
known bugs for which ground truth can be used to verify a fuzzer’s
findings.
While the CGC sample set provides crashing inputs—also known
as a proof of vulnerability (PoV)—for all known bugs, it does not
provide a mechanism for determining the root cause of a fuzzer-
generated crash. Similarly, the Google FTS provides PoVs (for 87 %
of bugs) and a script for triaging and deduplicating crashes. This
script parses the crash report or looks for a specific line of code at
which to terminate program execution. However, this approach is
limited and does not allow for the detection of complex bugs (e.g.,
where simply executing a line of code is not sufficient to trigger
the bug).
In contrast to the CGC and Google FTS benchmarks, for which
ground truth is available but not easily accessible, LAVA-M clearly
reports the bug triggered by a crashing input. However, LAVA-M
does not provide a runtime interface for accessing this information.
Unless a fuzzer is specialized to collect LAVA-M metrics, it cannot
monitor progress in real-time. Thus, a post-processing step is re-
quired to collect metrics. Finally, Google FuzzBench relies solely on
coverage profiles (rather than fault-based metrics) to evaluate and
compare fuzzers. FuzzBench dismisses the need for ground truth,
which we believe sacrifices the significance of the results: more cov-
erage does not necessarily imply higher bug-finding effectiveness.
Ground-truth bug knowledge allows for a fuzzer’s findings to be
verified, enabling accurate performance evaluation and allowing
meaningful comparisons between fuzzers. To this end, a fuzzing
benchmark must provide easy access to ground-truth metrics describ-
ing the bugs a fuzzer can reach, trigger, and detect.
3.3 Usability (P3)
Fuzzers have evolved from simple blackbox random-input genera-
tion to complex data- and control-flow analysis tools. Each fuzzer
may introduce its own instrumentation into a target binary (e.g.,
AFL [58]), launch the program in a specific execution engine (e.g.,
QSYM [57], Driller [51]), or provide inputs through a specific chan-
nel (e.g., libFuzzer [31]). Fuzzers come in a variety of forms (de-
scribed in Section 2.1), so a fuzzing benchmark must not exclude a
particular type of fuzzer. Additionally, using a benchmark must be
manageable and straightforward: it should not require constant user
intervention, and benchmarking should finish within a reasonable
time frame. The inherent randomness of fuzzing complicates this,
as multiple trials are required to achieve statistically-meaningful
results.
Some existing benchmark workloads (e.g., those from CGC and
Google FTS) contain multiple bugs, so it is not sufficient to only run
the fuzzer until the first crash is encountered. However, the lack
of easily-accessible ground truth makes it difficult to determine
if/when all bugs are triggered. Moreover, inaccurate deduplication
techniques mean that the user cannot simply equate the number
of crashes with the number of bugs. Thus, additional time must be
spent triaging crashes to obtain ground-truth bug counts, further
complicating the benchmarking process.
In summary, a benchmark should be usable by fuzzer develop-
ers, without introducing insurmountable or impractical barriers to
adoption. To satisfy this property, a benchmark must thus provide
a small set of targets with a large number of discoverable bugs, and it
must provide a usable framework that measures and reports fuzzer
progress and performance.
4 MAGMA: APPROACH
We present Magma, a ground-truth fuzzing benchmark that sat-
isfies the previously-discussed benchmark properties. Magma is
a collection of seven targets with widespread use in real-world
environments. These initial targets have been carefully selected for
their diversity and the variety of security-critical bugs that have
been reported throughout their lifetimes (satisfying P1).
Importantly, Magma’s seven workloads contain 118 bugs for
which ground truth is easily accessible and verifiable (satisfying P2).
These bugs are sourced from older versions of the seven workloads,
and then forward-ported to the latest version contained within
Magma. Finally, Magma imposes minimal requirements on the user,
allowing fuzzer developers to seamlessly integrate the benchmark
into their development cycle (satisfying P3).
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4.1 Overview
For each workload, we manually inspect bug and vulnerability
reports to find bugs that are suitable for inclusion in Magma (e.g.,
ensuring that the bug affects the core codebase). For these bugs,
we reintroduce (“inject”) each bug into the latest version of the
code through a process we call forward-porting (described more in
Section 4.3). In addition to the bug, we also insert minimal source-
code instrumentation—a canary—to collect data about a fuzzer’s
ability to reach and trigger the bug (discussedmore in Section 4.4). A
bug is reached when the faulty line of code is executed, and triggered
when the fault condition is satisfied. Finally, Magma provides a
runtime monitor that runs in parallel with the fuzzer to collect real-
time statistics. These statistics are used to evaluate the fuzzer (see
Section 4.5).
Fuzzer evaluation is based on the number of bugs reached, trig-
gered, and detected. The Magma instrumentation only yields usable
information when the fuzzer exercises the instrumented code; this
allows us to determine whether a bug is reached. The dataflow gen-
erated by the fuzzer triggers a bug when that dataflow satisfies the
bug’s trigger conditions. Once triggered, the fuzzer should flag the
bug as a fault or crash, enabling us to assess the fuzzer’s bug detec-
tion capability. These metrics are described further in Section 4.4.
Finally, Magma provides a fatal canaries mode, where, if a ca-
nary’s condition is satisfied, the program is terminated (similar
to LAVA-M). The fuzzer then saves this crashing input for post-
processing. Fatal canaries are a form of ideal sanitization, in which
triggering a bug immediately results in a crash, regardless of the
nature of the bug. Fatal canaries allow developers to evaluate their
fuzzers under ideal sanitization assumptions without incurring ad-
ditional sanitization overhead. This mode increases the number of
executions during an evaluation, reducing the cost of evaluating
a fuzzer but sacrificing the ability to evaluate a fuzzer’s detection
capabilities.
4.2 Target Selection
Magma contains seven targets, which we summarize in Table 2.
In addition to these seven targets (the codebases into which bugs
are injected), Magma also includes 19 drivers (executable programs
that provide a command-line interface to the target) that exercise
different functionality within the target. Inspired by Google OSS-
Fuzz [3], these drivers are sourced from the original target codebases
(as drivers are best developed by domain experts).
Magma’s seven targets were selected for their diversity in func-
tionality (summarized in Table 2). Inspired by existing benchmarks
in other fields [8, 43], we apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
to quantify this diversity. We draw from Section 3.1 and use the
following low- and high-level PCA features, extracted from the
LLVM intermediate representation of a target program:
Instructions: The type of instructions used (e.g., binary opera-
tions, bitwise binary operations, memory access and address-
ing operations).
Complexity: Cyclomatic [35] and Halstead [23] complexity met-
rics.
APIs: The libraries and components used by the target.
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Figure 1: Comparison of benchmark bug classes. A complete
list of Magma bugs is presented in Table A1.
4.3 Bug Selection and Insertion
Magma contains 118 bugs, spanning 12 bug classes (summarized in
Figure 1; the complete list of bugs is given in Table A1). Compared
to existing benchmarks, Magma contains the widest variety of bugs
(followed by Google FTS, with ten different bug classes). Moreover,
Magma has the second-largest “bug density”—the ratio of the num-
ber of bugs to the number of targets—after LAVA-M (see Table 1).
While LAVA-M’s bug density (566.25) is an order-of-magnitude
larger than Magma’s (16.86), it is important to note that LAVA-M
is restricted to a single, synthetic bug type.
In addition to a diversity of bug classes, Magma also contains
bugs with a range of complexities. We approximate bug complexity
by the set of constraints required to trigger a bug: the greater the
number of constraints, the more obstacles the fuzzer must overcome
to reach and trigger a bug. Specifically, bug complexity is approxi-
mated by: (i) minimizing a PoV with afl-tmin [58]; (ii) concolically
executing these minimized PoVs in SymCC [42] to produce a set of
path constraints; (iii) bit-blasting these path constraints from quan-
tifier-free bitvector SMT to conjunctive normal form (CNF) SAT; and
then (iv) counting the number of clauses in the CNF SAT equation
(intuitively, the more clauses in the normalized constraint set, the
harder the fuzzer must work to satisfy these constraints and thus
trigger the bug).
Finally, Magma contains real bugs sourced from bug reports and
forward-ported to the most recent version of the target codebase.
This is in contrast to existing fuzzing benchmarks (e.g., BugBench,
Google FTS) that rely on old, unpatched versions of the target
codebase. Unfortunately, using older codebases limits the number of
bugs available in each target (as evident by the low bug densities in
Table 1). In comparison, forward-porting—which is synonymous to
back-porting fixes from newer codebases to older, buggy releases—
does not suffer from this issue, making Magma’s targets easily
extensible.
Forward-porting begins with the identification—from the re-
ported bug fix—of the code changes that must be reverted to rein-
troduce the bug. Bug-fix commits can contain multiple fixes to
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Table 2: The targets, driver programs, bug counts, and evaluated features incorporated into Magma. The versions used are the
latest at the time of writing.
Target Drivers Version File type Bugs Magicvalues
Recursive
parsing Compression Checksums Global state
libpng read_fuzzer, readpng 1.6.38 PNG 7 ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
libtiff read_rgba_fuzzer, tiffcp 4.1.0 TIFF 14 ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
libxml2 read_memory_fuzzer, xmllint 2.9.10 XML 18 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
poppler pdf_fuzzer, pdfimages, pdftoppm 0.88.0 PDF 22 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
openssl
asn1parse, bignum, x509, server,
client
3.0.0 Binary blobs 21 ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
sqlite3 sqlite3_fuzz 3.32.0 SQL queries 20 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
php json, exif, unserialize, parser 8.0.0−dev Various 16 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
one or more bugs, so disambiguation is necessary to prevent the
introduction of unintended bugs. Alternatively, bug fixes may be
spread over multiple commits (e.g., if the original fix did not cover
all edge cases). Following the identification of code changes, we
identify what program state is involved in evaluating the trigger
condition. If necessary, we introduce additional program variables
to access that state. From this state, we determine a boolean expres-
sion that serves as an oracle for identifying a triggered bug. Finally,
we identify a point in the program where we inject a canary before
the bug can manifest faulty behavior. This canary helps measure
our fuzzer performance metrics, discussed in the following section.
4.4 Performance Metrics
Fuzzer evaluation has traditionally relied on crash counts, bug
counts, and/or code-coverage profiles for measuring and compar-
ing fuzzer performance. While the problems with crash counts
and code-coverage profiles are well known (see Section 2.2.2), in
our view, simply counting the number of bugs discovered is too
coarse-grained. Instead, we argue that it is important to distinguish
between reaching, triggering, and detecting a bug. Consequently,
Magma uses these three bug-centric performance metrics to evalu-
ate fuzzers.
A reached bug refers to a bug whose oracle was called, implying
that the executed path reaches the context of the bug, without
necessarily triggering a fault. This is where coverage profiles fall
short: simply covering the faulty code does not mean that the
program is in the correct state to trigger the bug. Hence, a triggered
bug refers to a bug that was reached, and whose triggering condition
was satisfied, indicating that a fault occurred. Whereas triggering a
bug implies that the program has transitioned into a faulty state, the
symptoms of the fault may not be directly observable at the oracle
injection site. When a bug is triggered, the oracle only indicates
that the conditions for a fault have been satisfied, but this does not
imply that the fault was encountered or detected by the fuzzer.
Source-code instrumentation provides ground-truth knowledge
and runtime feedback of reached and triggered bugs. Each bug is
approximated by (a) the lines of code patched in response to a bug
report, and (b) a boolean expression representing the bug’s trigger
condition. Our source code instrumentation—the canary—reports
(i) when the line of code is reached; and (ii) when the input satisfies
the conditions for faulty behavior (i.e., triggers the bug). Section 5.4
discusses how we prevent canaries from leaking information to the
SUT.
Finally, we also draw a distinction between triggering and de-
tecting a bug. Whereas most security-critical bugs manifest as a
low-level security policy violation for which state-of-the-art sani-
tizers are well-suited (e.g., memory corruption, data races, invalid
arithmetic), other bug classes are not as easily observed. For exam-
ple, resource exhaustion bugs are often detected long after the fault
has manifested, either through a timeout or an out-of-memory error.
Even more obscure are semantic bugs, whose malfunctions cannot
be observed without a specification or reference. Consequently,
various fuzzing techniques have been developed to target these bug
classes (e.g., SlowFuzz [40] and NEZHA [39]). Such advancements
in fuzzer techniques may benefit from an evaluation which includes
the bug detection rate as another dimension for comparison.
4.5 Runtime Monitoring
Magma provides a runtime monitor that collects real-time statistics
from the instrumented target program. This provides a mechanism
for visualizing the fuzzer’s progress and its evolution over time,
without complicating the instrumentation.
The runtime monitor collects data about reached and triggered
bugs (Section 4.4). Because this data primarily relates to the fuzzer’s
program exploration capabilities, we post-process the monitor’s
output to study the fuzzer’s fault detection capabilities. This is
achieved by replaying the crashing inputs (produced by the fuzzer)
against the benchmark canaries to determine which bugs were
triggered and hence detected. Importantly, it is possible that the
fuzzer produces crashing inputs that do not correspond to any
injected bug. If this occurs, the new bug is triaged and added to the
benchmark for other fuzzers to discover.
5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
DECISIONS
Magma’s unapologetic focus on fuzzing (as opposed to being a
general bug-detection benchmark) necessitates a number of key
design and implementation choices, which we discuss here.
5.1 Forward-Porting
5.1.1 Forward-Porting vs. Back-Porting. In contrast to back-porting
bugs to previous versions, forward-porting ensures that all known
bugs are fixed, and that the reintroduced bugs will have ground-
truth oracles. While it is possible that the new fixes and features
in newer codebases may (re)introduce unknown bugs, forward-
porting allows Magma to evolve with each published bug fix. Ad-
ditionally, future code changes may render a forward-ported bug
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obsolete, or make its trigger conditions unsatisfiable. Without ver-
ification, forward-porting may inject bugs which cannot be trig-
gered. We use fuzzing to reduce this possibility, reducing the cost of
manually verifying injected bugs. A fuzzer-generated PoV demon-
strates that the bug is triggerable. Bugs that are discovered this
way are added to the list of verified bugs, helping the evaluation
of other fuzzers. While this approach may skew Magma towards
fuzzer-discoverable bugs, we argue that this is a nonissue: any
newly-discovered PoV will update the benchmark, thus ensuring a
fair and balanced bug distribution.
5.1.2 Manual Forward-Porting. All Magma bugs are manually in-
troduced through human effort. This process involves: (i) searching
for bug reports; (ii) identifying bugs that affect the core codebase;
(iii) finding the relevant fix commits; (iv) recognizing the bug condi-
tions from the fix commits; (v) collecting these conditions as a set of
path constraints; (vi) modeling these path constraints as a boolean
expression (the bug canary); and (vii) injecting these canaries to
flag bugs at runtime. The complexity of this process led us to reject
a wholly-automated approach; automating bug injection would
likely result in an incomplete and error-prone technique, ultimately
yielding fewer bugs of lower quality. Moreover, an automated ap-
proach still requires manual verification of the results. Dedicating
human resources to the forward-porting process maximizes the
correctness of Magma’s bugs.
To justify a manual approach, we enumerate the scopes (i.e., code
blocks, functions, modules) spanned by each bug fix and use these
scopes as a simplified measure of bug-porting complexity (scope
measures for all bugs are given in Table A1). While a simple bug-
porting technique works well for fixes with a scope of one, the
bug-porting technique must become more advanced as the number
of scopes increases (e.g., it must handle interprocedural constraints).
Of the 118 Magma bugs, 34 % had a scope measure greater than
one.
Finally, our manual porting process was heavily reliant on prose;
in particular, by the comments and discussions contained within a
bug report. These discussions provide valuable insight into (a) devel-
opers’ intent and (b) the construction of precise trigger conditions.
Additionally, function names (particularly those from the standard
library) provide key insight into the code’s objective, without requir-
ing in-depth analysis into what each function does. An automated
technique would require either: (i) an in-depth analysis of such
functions, likely resulting in path explosion; or (ii) inference of bug
conditions and function utilities via natural language processing
(NLP). Both of these approaches are too complex to be included
in the scope of Magma’s development and would likely require
several years of research to be effective.
5.2 Weird States
When a fuzzer generates an input that triggers an undetected bug,
and execution continues past this bug, the program transitions into
an undefined state: a weird state [15]. Any information collected
after transitioning to a weird state is unreliable. To address this
issue, we allow the fuzzer to continue the execution trace, but only
collect bug oracle data before and until the first bug is triggered (i.e.,
transition to a weird state). Oracles do not signify that a bug has
1 void libfoo_baz(char *str) {
2 struct { char buf [16]; size_t len; } tmp;
3 tmp.len = strlen(str);
4 // possible OOB write in strcpy ()
5 magma_log (17, tmp.len >= sizeof(tmp.buf));
6 strcpy(tmp.buf , str);
7 // Possible div -by-zero if tmp.len == 0
8 magma_log(9, tmp.len == 0);
9 int repeat = 64 / tmp.len;
10 int padlen = 64 %
11 }
Listing 1: Weird states can result in execution traces which
do not exist in the context of normal program behavior.
been executed; they only indicate whether the conditions required
to execute a bug are satisfied.
Listing 1 shows an example of the interplay between weird states.
This example contains two bugs: an out-of-bounds write (deonated
as bug 17) and a division-by-zero (bug 6). When tmp.len == 0,
the condition for bug 17 on line 6 is not satisfied, and bug 9 is
captured on line 8 and triggered on line 9 (resulting in a divide-
by-zero error). When tmp.len > 16, bug 17 is captured on line
5 and triggered on line 6. Furthermore, tmp.len is overwritten in
the struct by a non-zero value, and bug 9 is not triggered. However,
bug 17 is triggered when tmp.len == 16, overwriting tmp.len in
the struct with the NULL terminator and setting its value to 0 (on
a Little-Endian system). This triggers bug 9, despite the input not
explicitly specifying a zero-length str.
5.3 A Static Benchmark
Much like other widely-used performance benchmarks—e.g., SPEC
CPU [50] and DaCapo [8]—Magma is a static benchmark that con-
tains realistic workloads. These benchmarks assume that if the
system-under-test (SUT) performs well on the benchmark’s work-
loads, then it will perform similarly on real workloads. While realis-
tic, static benchmarks are susceptible to overfitting. Overfitting can
occur if developers tweak the SUT to perform better on a bench-
mark, rather than focusing on real workloads.
Overfitting could be overcome by dynamically synthesizing a
benchmark (and ensuring that the SUT is unaware of the synthesis
parameters). However, this approach risks generating workloads
different from real-world scenarios, rendering the evaluation bi-
ased and/or incomplete. While program synthesis is a long-studied
topic [7, 22, 26], it remains difficult to generate large programs that
remain faithful to real development patterns and styles.
To prevent overfitting, Magma’s forward-porting process allows
targets to be updated as they evolve in the real-world. Each forward-
ported bug requires minimal code changes: the addition of Magma’s
instrumentation and the faulty code itself. This makes it relatively
straightforward to update targets, including introducing new bugs
and new features. For example, two undergraduate students with-
out software security experience added over 60 bugs in three new
targets over a single semester. These measures ensure that Magma
remains representative of real, complex targets and suitable for
fuzzer evaluation.
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1 void magma_log(int id, bool condition) {
2 extern struct magma_bug *bugs; // = mmap (...)
3 extern bool faulty; // = false initially
4 bugs[id]. reached += 1 & (faulty ^ 1);
5 bugs[id]. triggered += condition & (faulty ^ 1);
6 faulty = faulty | condition;
7 }
Listing 2: Magma instrumentation.
1 void libfoo_bar () {
2 // uint32_t a, b, c;
3 magma_log (42, (a == 0) | (b == 0));
4 // possible divide -by-zero
5 uint32_t x = c / (a * b);
6 }
Listing 3: Instrumented example.
5.4 Leaky Oracles
Introducing oracles into the benchmark may leak information that
interferes with a fuzzer’s exploration capability, potentially leading
to overfitting (as discussed in Section 5.3). For example, if oracles
were implemented as if statements, fuzzers that maximize branch
coverage could detect the oracle’s branch and find an input that
satisfies the branch condition.
One possible solution to this leaky oracle problem is to produce
both instrumented and uninstrumented target binaries (with re-
spect to Magma’s instrumentation, not any instrumentation that
the fuzzer injects). The fuzzer’s input would be feed into both bi-
naries, but the fuzzer would only collect the data it needs (e.g.,
coverage feedback) from the uninstrumented binary. The instru-
mented binary would then collect canary data and report it to the
runtime monitor. This approach, however, introduces other chal-
lenges associated with duplicating the execution trace between two
binaries (e.g., replicating the environment, maintaining synchro-
nization between executions), which greatly complicates Magma’s
implementation and introduces runtime overheads.
Instead, we use always-evaluate memory writes. First, an injected
bug oracle evaluates a boolean expression representing the bug’s
trigger condition. This typically involves a binary comparison op-
erator, which most compilers (e.g., gcc, clang) translate into a pair
of cmp and set instructions embedded into the execution path. The
results of this evaluation are then shared with the runtime monitor
(Section 4.5). This process is demonstrated in Listings 2 and 3.
Listing 2 shows Magma’s canary implementation. The always-
evaluated memory accesses are shown in lines 4 and 5. The faulty
flag addresses the problem of weird states (Section 5.2), and disables
future canaries after the first bug is encountered.
Listing 3 shows an example program instrumented with a canary.
A call to magma_log is inserted (line 3) prior to the execution of
the faulty code (line 5). Compound trigger conditions—i.e., those
including the logical and and or operators—often generate implicit
branches at compile-time (due to short-circuit compiler behavior).
To avoid leaking information through coverage, we provide custom
x86-64 assembly blocks to evaluate these logical operators in a sin-
gle basic block (without short-circuit behavior). We revert to C’s
bitwise operators (& and |)—which are more brittle and suscepti-
ble to safety-agnostic compiler passes [49]—when the compilation
target is not x86-64.
Although this approach may introduce memory access patterns
that are detectable by taint tracking and other data-flow analysis
techniques, statistical tests can be used to infer whether the fuzzer
overfits to these access patterns. By repeating the fuzzing campaign
with the uninstrumented binary, we can verify if the results vary
significantly.
5.5 Proofs of Vulnerability
In order to increase confidence in the injected bugs, a proof of
vulnerability (PoV) input must be supplied for every bug, verifying
that the bug can be triggered. The process of manually crafting
PoVs, however, is arduous and requires domain-specific knowledge,
both about the input format and the target program, potentially
bringing the bug-injection process to a grinding halt.
When available, we extract PoVs from public bug reports. When
no PoV is available, we launch multiple fuzzing campaigns against
these targets in an attempt to trigger each injected bug. Inputs that
trigger a bug are saved as a PoV. Bugs which are not triggered, even
after multiple campaigns, are manually inspected to verify path
reachability and satisfiability of trigger conditions.
5.6 Unknown Bugs
Because Magma uses real-world programs, it is possible that bugs
exist for which no ground-truth is available (i.e., an oracle does not
exist). A fuzzer might inadvertantly trigger these bugs and (cor-
rectly) detect a fault. Due to the imperfections in automated dedu-
plication techniques, these crashes are not included in Magma’s
metrics. Instead, such crashes are used to improve Magma itself.
The bug’s root cause can be determined by manually studying the
execution trace, after which the bug can be added to the benchmark.
5.7 Fuzzer Compatibility
Fuzzers are not limited to a specific execution engine under which
they analyze and explore a program. For example, some fuzzers
(e.g., Driller [51], T-Fuzz [38]) leverage symbolic execution (using
an engine such as angr [47]) to explore the target program. This
can introduce (a) incompatibilities with Magma’s instrumentation,
and (b) inconsistencies in the runtime environment (depending on
how the symbolic execution engine models the environment).
However, the defining trait of most fuzzers, in contrast to other
types of bug-finding tools, is that they concretely execute the tar-
get on the host system. Unlike benchmarks such as the CGC and
BugBench—which aim to evaluate all bug-finding tools—Magma
is unapologetically a fuzzing benchmark. This includes whitebox
fuzzers that use symbolic execution to guide input generation, pro-
vided that the target is executed on the host system.
We therefore impose the following restriction on the fuzzers
evaluated by Magma: the fuzzer must execute the target program
in the context of an OS process, with unrestricted access to OS facil-
ities (e.g., system calls, libraries, file system). This allows Magma’s
runtime monitor to extract canary statistics using the operating
system’s services at relatively low overhead/complexity.
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Figure 2: Significance of evaluations of fuzzer pairs using p-values from the Mann-Whitney U-Test. We use p < 0.05 as a
threshold for significance. Values greater than the threshold are shaded red. Darker shading indicates a lower p-value, or
higher statistical significance. White cells indicate that the pair of sample sets are identical.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Methodology
We evaluated several fuzzers in order to establish the versatility of
our metrics and benchmark suite. We chose a set of six mutational
greybox fuzzers whose source code was available at the time of
writing: AFL [58], AFLFast [10], AFL++ [25], FairFuzz [30],MOpt-
AFL [33], and honggfuzz [20]. These six fuzzers were evaluated
over ten identical 24 h fuzzing campaigns for each fuzzer/target
combination. This amounted to 200 000CPU-hours of fuzzing.
Benchmark parameters were identical across all fuzzing cam-
paigns to ensure fairness. Each fuzzer was bootstrapped with the
same set of seed files sourced from the original target codebase and
configured with a 50ms timeout and 50MiB memory limit. The
Magma monitoring utility was configured to poll canary informa-
tion every five seconds. All experiments were run on one of three
machines, each with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 5218 CPU and 64 GB of
RAM, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS 64-bit. The targets were compiled
for x86-64.
Notably, all six fuzzers implement fault detection as a simple
crash/hang listener (Section 2.2.2). This makes it possible to lever-
age Magma’s fatal canaries mode (Section 4.1) to evaluate a fuzzer’s
program exploration and fault detection capabilities. Using fatal
canaries to evaluate reached and triggered bugs is only applicable
to fuzzers whose fault detection relies solely on hangs or crashes.
If a fuzzer implements a different method for identifying erroneous
states (e.g., semantic bug-finding tools such as NEZHA [39]), then
their method must be used when evaluating the fuzzer’s fault de-
tection capability. It is important not to introduce bias into the
evaluation: if a fuzzer like NEZHA is compared against one like
AFL, then AFL targets must not be compiled with fatal canaries.
This is because fatal canaries stop the target’s execution prema-
turely upon finding a bug, thus potentially providing AFL with
an unfair performance advantage. Benchmark parameters must be
identical for all evaluated fuzzers to ensure fairness.
AddressSanitizer (ASan) [46] is used to evaluate detected bugs.
Crashing inputs (generated by fatal canaries) are replayed through
the ASan-instrumented targets; the fuzzer can correctly detect the
bug if the target hangs, exceeds its memory limit, or reports a crash.
While ASan introduces overhead that affects execution speeds and
timeouts, and thus the fuzzer’s ability to detect some faults, we
choose the minimum default thresholds. This ensures that, in the
worst case, the evaluation does not undermine the fuzzer’s capa-
bilities. Instead, it assumes that the fuzzer is configured with strict
Table 3: The mean number of bugs found by each fuzzer
across ten campaigns. The standard deviation is also given.
The best performing fuzzer(s) (per target) is highlighted in
green (ties are included).
Target honggfuzz afl moptafl aflfast afl++ fairfuzz
libpng 3.6 ± 0.52 1.6 ± 0.70 1.0 ± 0.00 1.3 ± 0.48 1.2 ± 0.42 1.5 ± 0.53
libtiff 4.7 ± 0.67 4.8 ± 0.42 4.4 ± 0.52 4.2 ± 0.42 3.4 ± 0.52 4.8 ± 1.23
libxml2 5.0 ± 0.47 2.9 ± 0.32 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 2.6 ± 0.52
openssl 2.8 ± 0.63 2.9 ± 0.57 3.0 ± 0.00 2.6 ± 0.52 3.0 ± 0.67 2.0 ± 0.47
php 2.8 ± 0.42 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 1.6 ± 0.70
poppler 3.8 ± 0.92 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 3.0 ± 0.00 2.9 ± 0.32
sqlite3 3.2 ± 0.63 0.8 ± 0.92 1.2 ± 1.14 1.2 ± 0.79 1.6 ± 0.84 1.5 ± 0.53
fault-detection parameters and can thus detect more bugs. Although
this may introduce false-positives during post-processing (e.g., a
bug may be labeled as “detected”, whereas in fact the fuzzer may not
have detected it during a campaign), it also skews results in favor
of the evaluated fuzzers (because the fuzzers report more bugs).
Although this evaluation method measures ASan’s fault-detection
capabilities, it still highlights the bugs that fuzzers can realistically
detect when fuzzing without ground truth.
6.2 Time to Bug
We use the time to find a bug as a measure of fuzzer performance.
As discussed in Section 4.4, Magma records the time taken to both
reach and trigger a bug, allowing us to compare fuzzer performance
across multiple dimensions. Fuzzing campaigns are typically limited
to a finite duration (we limit our campaigns to 24 h, repeated ten
times), so it is important that the time-to-bug discovery is low.
The highly-stochastic nature of fuzzing means that the time to
find a bug can vary wildly between identical trials. To account for
this variation, we repeat each trial ten times. Despite this repitition,
a fuzzer may still fail to find a bug within the alloted time, leading
to missing measurements. We therefore apply survival analysis to
account for this missing data and high variation in bug discovery
times. Specifically, we adopt Wagner’s approach [53] and use the
Kaplan-Meier estimator [27] to model a bug’s survival function.
This survival function describes the probability that a bug remains
undiscovered (i.e., “survives”) within a given time (here, a 24 h trial).
A smaller survival time indicates better fuzzer performance.
6.3 Experimental Results
Table 3, Figure 2, and Table A2 present the results of our fuzzing
campaigns.
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6.3.1 Bug Count and Statistical Significance. Table 3 shows the
mean number of bugs found per fuzzer (across ten 24 h campaigns).
These values are susceptible to outliers, limiting the conclusions
that we can draw about fuzzer performance. We therefore con-
ducted a statistical significance analysis of the collected sample-set
pairs to calculate p-values using theMann-Whitney U-test. P-values
provide a measure of how different a pair of sample sets are, and
how significant these differences are. Because our results are col-
lected from independent populations (i.e., different fuzzers), we
make no assumptions about their distributions. Hence, we apply
the Mann-Whitney U-test to measure statistical significance. Fig-
ure 2 shows the results of this analysis.
The Mann-Whitney U-test shows that AFL, AFLFast, AFL++,
andMOpt-AFL performed similarly against most targets, despite
some minor differences in mean bug counts (shown in Table 3). The
calculated p-values show that, in most cases, the small fluctuations
in mean bug counts are not significant, and the results are thus not
sufficiently conclusive.
One oddity is the performance of AFL++ against libtiff. Table 3
reveals an overall lower mean bug count for AFL++ compared to all
other fuzzers, and Figure 2 shows that this difference is statistically
significant. While Table A2 shows that AFL++ triggered five libtiff
bugs across the ten campaigns, its performance was inconsistent,
resulting in a low mean bug count.We therefore conclude that the
performance of all AFL-based fuzzers with default configurations
against Magma is, to a large degree, equivalent.
FairFuzz [30] also displayed significant performance regression
against libxml2, openssl, and php. While the original evaluation
of FairFuzz claims that it achieved the highest coverage against
xmllint, that improvement was not reflected in our results.
Finally, honggfuzz performed significantly better than all other
fuzzers in four out of seven targets, possibly because of its wrapping
of memory-comparison functions.
6.3.2 Time to Bug. In total, 72 of the 118 Magma bugs (61 %) were
reached. Additionally, 38 of the 46 verified bugs (83 %)—i.e., those
with PoVs—were triggered. Notably, no single fuzzer triggered more
than 33 bugs (72 % of the verified bugs). These results are presented
in Table A2. Here, bugs are sorted by the mean trigger time, which
we use to approximate “difficulty”.
The long bug discovery times (18 of the 38 triggered bugs—
47 %—took on average more than 20 h to trigger) suggests that
the evaluated fuzzers still have a long way to go in improving
program exploration. However, while many of the Magma bugs are
difficult to discover, Table A2 highlights a set of 17 “simple” bugs
that all fuzzers find consistently within 24 h. These bugs provide a
baseline for detecting performance regression: if a new fuzzer fails
to discover these bugs, then its policy or implementation should be
revisited.
Most of the bugs in Table A2 were reached by all fuzzers. AFL++
was the worst performing fuzzer in this regard, failing to reach
five bugs (the highest amongst the six evaluated fuzzers). Interest-
ingly, most bugs show a large difference between reach and trigger
times. For example, only the first three bugs listed in Table A2 were
triggered when first reached. In contrast, bugs such as MAE115
(from openssl) take 10 s to reach (by all fuzzers), but up to 20 h
(on average) to trigger. This difference between time-to-reach and
time-to-trigger a bug provides another feature for determining bug
“difficulty”: while control flowmay be trivially satisfied (as evidence
by the time to reach a bug), bugs such as MAE115 may require
complex, stateful data-flow constraints.
Figure 3 plots four survival functions for three Magma bugs
(AAH018, JCH232, and AAH020). These plots illustrate the proba-
bility of a bug surviving a 24 h fuzzing trial, and are generated by
applying the Kaplan-Meier estimate to the results of ten repeated
fuzzing trials. Dotted lines represent survival functions for reached
bugs, while solid lines represent survival functions for triggered
bugs.
Figure 3a shows the time to reach bug AAH018 (libtiff ). Notably,
this bug was not triggered by any of the six evaluated fuzzers. Thus,
the probability of bug AAH018 “surviving” 24 h (i.e., not being
triggered) remains at one.
In comparison, Figure 3b shows the differences in the time taken
to reach and trigger bug JCH232 (sqlite3). Here, honggfuzz is the
best performer, because the bug’s probability of survival approaches
zero the fastest. Notably, the variance is much higher compared to
bug AAH018 (as evident by the larger confidence intervals).
Finally, Figure 3d and Figure 3c compare the probability of sur-
vival for bug AAH020 (libtiff ) across two driver programs: tiffcp
and read_rgba_fuzzer. The former is a general-purpose applica-
tion, while the latter is a driver specifically designed as a fuzzer
harness. While the bug is reached relatively quickly by both drivers,
the fuzzer harness is clearly superior at triggering the bug, as it is
faster across all fuzzers. This result supports our claim in ?? that
domain experts are most suitable for selecting and developing fuzzing
drivers.
Again, it is clear that honggfuzz outperforms all other fuzzers
(in both reaching and triggering bugs), finding 11 additional bugs
not triggered by other fuzzers. In addition to its finer-grained in-
strumentation, honggfuzz natively supports persistent fuzzing. Our
experiments show that honggfuzz’s execution rate was at least three
times higher than that of AFL-based fuzzers using persistent drivers.
This undoubtedly contributes to honggfuzz’s strong performance.
6.3.3 Seed Coverage. Our evaluation used seeds provided by the
developers of the Magma targets. These seeds may exercise differ-
ent code paths that intersect with Magma’s injected bugs, making
it easier for coverage-guided fuzzers to find and trigger these bugs.
Although we do not use a specific seed selection policy, we provide
the same set of seeds across all campaigns to allow for fair eval-
uations. This is evident in our results, as all seed-coverage bugs
are “reached” by the fuzzers around the same time (see Table A2).
Most bugs not included in seed coverage show significantly increas-
ing time-to-bug measurements, which highlight different fuzzer
specialties and begin to show performance improvements brought
upon by the evaluated fuzzers.
6.3.4 Achilles’ Heel of Mutational Fuzzing. AAH001 (CVE-2018-
13785, shown in Listing 4), is a divide-by-zero bug in libpng. It is
triggeredwhen the input is a non-interlaced 8-bit RGB image, whose
width is exactly 0x55555555. This “magic value” is not encoded
anywhere in the target, and is easily calculated by solving the
constraints for row_factor == 0. However, random mutational
fuzzing struggles to discover these types of bugs. This is because the
fuzzer has a large input space from which to sample from, making
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(a) Bug AAH018 (libtiff with read_rgba_fuzzer).
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(c) Bug AAH020 (libtiff with tiffcp).
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(d) Bug AAH020 (libtiff with read_rgba_fuzzer).
Figure 3: Survival functions for a subset of Magma bugs. The y-axis is the survival probability for the given bug. Dotted lines
represent survival functions for reached bugs, while solid lines represent survival functions for triggered bugs. Confidence
intervals are also shown.
it unlikely to pick the exact byte sequence (here, 0x55555555). This
manifests in our results as a high expected time-to-bug: the only
fuzzer to trigger this bug was AFL, and it was only able to do so
once (in ten trials).
1 void png_check_chunk_length(png_ptr , length) {
2 size_t row_factor = png_ptr ->width // uint32_t
3 * png_ptr ->channels // uint32_t
4 * (png_ptr ->bit_depth > 8? 2: 1)
5 + 1
6 + (png_ptr ->interlaced? 6: 0);
7
8 if (png_ptr ->height > UINT_32_MAX/row_factor) {
9 idat_limit = UINT_31_MAX;
10 }
11 }
Listing 4: Divide-by-zero bug in libpng. Program input
undergoes non-trivial transformations to trigger the bug.
6.3.5 Magic Value Identification. AAH007 is a dangling pointer
bug in libpng, and illustrates how some fuzzer features improve
bug-finding ability. To trigger this bug, it is sufficient for a fuzzer to
provide a valid input with an eXIF chunk (which is then not marked
for release upon object destruction, leading to the dangling pointer).
Unlike the AFL-based fuzzers, honggfuzz is able to consistently
trigger this bug relatively early in each campaign. We posit that
this is due to honggfuzz replacing the strcmp function with an
instrumented wrapper that incrementally satisfies string magic-
value checks.
6.3.6 Semantic Bug Detection. AAH003 (CVE-2015-8472) is a data
inconsistency in libpng’s API, where two references to the same
piece of information (color-map size) can yield different values.
Such a semantic bug does not produce observable behavior that
violates a known security policy, and it cannot be detected by state-
of-the-art sanitizers without a specification of expected behavior.
This is evident in our results, as all fuzzers manage to reach this bug
very early in each campaign, but it consistently remains undetected.
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Semantic bugs are not always benign. Privilege escalation and
command injection are two of the most security-critical logic bugs
that are still found in modern systems, but they remain difficult
to detect with standard sanitization techniques. This observation
highlights the shortcomings of current fault detection mechanisms
and the need for more fault-oriented bug-finding techniques (e.g.,
NEZHA [39]).
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Existing Benchmarks. Magma allows us to make precise mea-
surements for our selected performance metric: time-to-bug. This
enables accurate comparisons between fuzzers across several di-
mensions: bugs reached, triggered, and detected. Previous work on
ground-truth benchmarks, namely LAVA-M, yields only a boolean
result for each injected bug: triggered or not triggered. Inference
of time-to-bug is not straightforward, as it relies on querying the
file system for the creation date of the crashing test cases—a fea-
ture not necessary supported by all file systems. LAVA-M also
provides no measure for bugs reached, and it treats all triggered
bugs as crashes. It is thus not suitable to evaluate a fuzzer’s fault
detection abilities. Google FuzzBench only measures edges covered
as a performance metric, dismissing fault-based metrics such as
crash counts or bug counts. Edge coverage, however, is only an
approximation of control-flow path coverage; relying on it as the
only performance metric may result in biased evaluations, as our
FairFuzz results highlight.
6.4.2 Ground Truth and Confidence. Ground truth enables us to
determine a crash’s root cause. Unlike many existing benchmarks,
Magma provides easy access to ground truth information. In partic-
ular, ground-truth knowledge is provided for all 118 injected bugs.
Orthogonally, a bug’s PoV serves as a witness that demonstrates
that a bug is triggerable. If fuzzer F does not trigger bug B with an
existing PoV, then we can state that fuzzer F fails to trigger bug B;
however, we cannot make this conclusion for bugs where no PoV
exists. Importantly, only bugs with PoVs can be used to confidently
measure a fuzzer’s performance. Currently, 39 % of Magma’s bugs
have a PoV. Regardless, bugs without a PoV remain useful: any
fuzzer evaluated against Magma can produce a PoV, increasing the
benchmark’s utility in the process. Widespread adoption of Magma
will increase the percentage of bugs with PoVs.
6.4.3 Beyond Crashes. Although Magma’s instrumentation does
not collect information about detected bugs—because detection is a
characteristic of the fuzzer and not the bug itself—Magma enables
the measurement of this metric through a post-processing step
(supported by fatal canaries, discussed in Section 4.1). In particular,
bugs are not restricted to crash-triggering faults. Some bugs result
in resource starvation (e.g., unbounded loops or mallocs), privilege
escalation, or undesirable outputs. Fuzzer developers acknowledge
the need for bugmetrics other than crashes: AFL has a hang timeout,
and SlowFuzz searches for inputs that trigger worst-case behavior.
The exclusion of non-crashing bugs from the evaluation leads to an
under-approximation of real bugs. Their inclusion, however, enables
better bug detection tools. Evaluating fuzzers based on bugs reached,
triggered, and detected allows us to classify fuzzers and compare
different approaches along multiple dimensions (e.g., bugs reached
allows an evaluation of the path exploration aspect, bugs triggered
and detected allows a distinctive analysis of a fuzzer’s constraint
generation and solving component). It also allows us to identify
which bug classes continue to evade state-of-the-art sanitization
techniques (and to what degree).
6.4.4 Magma as a Lasting Benchmark. Magma leverages software
with a long history of security bugs to build an extensible frame-
work with ground truth knowledge. Like most benchmarks, the
widespread adoption of Magma defines its utility. Benchmarks pro-
vide a common basis through which systems are evaluated and
compared. For instance, the community continues to use LAVA-M
to evaluate and compare fuzzers, despite the fact that most of its
bugs have been found, and that these bugs are of a single, syn-
thetic type. Magma aims to provide an evaluation benchmark that
incorporates realistic bugs in real software.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Magma is an open ground-truth fuzzing benchmark that enables
accurate and consistent fuzzer evaluation and performance compar-
ison. We designed and implemented Magma to provide researchers
with a benchmark containing real targets with real bugs. Addi-
tionally, Magma contains ground-truth bug instrumentation which
allows for real-time measurements of a fuzzer’s performance. After
carefully selecting targets with a wide variety of applications, and
a known history of security-critical bugs, we forward-ported 118
reported bugs and injected instrumentation that serves as ground-
truth knowledge.
Magma’s simple design and implementation allows it to be easily
improved, updated, and extended, making it ideal for open-source
collaborative development and contribution. Current weaknesses
will be addressed by increasing adoption: the more fuzzers that
are evaluated—ideally by the developers of those fuzzers—the bet-
ter the metrics are defined and the more accurate the results are.
Through repeated evaluations, the reachability and satisfiability of
bugs can then be satisfied or disproved through discovered PoVs (or
lack thereof). Additionally, Magma is extensible to support approx-
imate bug complexity/depth metrics. Such metrics provide further
insight about injected bugs, paving the way for establishing uni-
fied performance measures that allow direct comparisons between
fuzzers.
We evaluated Magma against six popular open-source mutation-
based greybox fuzzers (AFL, AFLFast, AFL++, FairFuzz,MOpt-AFL,
and honggfuzz). Our evaluation shows that ground-truth enables
accurate measurements of fuzzer performance. Our evaluation pro-
vides tangible insight on comparing fuzzers, why crash counts are
often misleading, and how randomness affects fuzzer performance.
It also brought to light the shortcomings of some existing fault
detection methods employed by fuzzers.
Despite best practices, evaluating fuzz testing remains challeng-
ing. With the adoption of ground-truth benchmarks like Magma,
fuzzer evaluation will become reproducible, allowing researchers
to showcase the true contributions of new fuzzing approaches.
REFERENCES
[1] 2020. The Industrial Age of Hacking. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 20). USENIX Association, 1129–1146. https://www.usenix.
org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/nosco
Magma: A Ground-Truth Fuzzing Benchmark
[2] Kayla Afanador and Cynthia Irvine. 2020. Representativeness in the Benchmark
for Vulnerability Analysis Tools (B-VAT). In 13th USENIX Workshop on Cyber
Security Experimentation and Test (CSET 20). USENIX Association. https://www.
usenix.org/conference/cset20/presentation/afanador
[3] Mike Aizatsky, Kostya Serebryany, Oliver Chang, Abhishek Arya, and Meredith
Whittaker. 2016. Announcing OSS-Fuzz: Continuous fuzzing for open source
software. https://opensource.googleblog.com/2016/12/announcing-oss-fuzz-
continuous-fuzzing.html. Accessed: 2019-09-09.
[4] Branden Archer and Darkkey. [n.d.]. radamsa: A Black-box mutational fuzzer.
https://gitlab.com/akihe/radamsa. Accessed: 2019-09-09.
[5] Brad Arkin. 2009. Adobe Reader and Acrobat Security Initiative. http://blogs.
adobe.com/security/2009/05/adobe_reader_and_acrobat_secur.html. Accessed:
2019-09-09.
[6] Abhishek Arya and Cris Neckar. 2012. Fuzzing for security. https://blog.
chromium.org/2012/04/fuzzing-for-security.html. Accessed: 2019-09-09.
[7] Domagoj Babic, Stefan Bucur, Yaohui Chen, Franjo Ivancic, Tim King, Markus
Kusano, Caroline Lemieux, LÃąszlÃş Szekeres, and Wei Wang. 2019. FUDGE:
Fuzz Driver Generation at Scale. In Proceedings of the 2019 27th ACM Joint Meeting
on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations
of Software Engineering.
[8] StephenM. Blackburn, Robin Garner, Chris Hoffmann, AsjadM. Khang, Kathryn S.
McKinley, Rotem Bentzur, Amer Diwan, Daniel Feinberg, Daniel Frampton,
Samuel Z. Guyer, Martin Hirzel, Antony Hosking, Maria Jump, Han Lee, J. Eliot B.
Moss, Aashish Phansalkar, Darko Stefanović, Thomas VanDrunen, Daniel von
Dincklage, and Ben Wiedermann. 2006. The DaCapo Benchmarks: Java Bench-
marking Development and Analysis. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual ACM
SIGPLAN Conference on Object-Oriented Programming Systems, Languages, and
Applications (Portland, Oregon, USA) (OOPSLA âĂŹ06). Association for Comput-
ing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 169âĂŞ190. https://doi.org/10.1145/1167473.
1167488
[9] Tim Blazytko, Moritz Schlögel, Cornelius Aschermann, Ali Abbasi, Joel Frank,
Simon Wörner, and Thorsten Holz. 2020. AURORA: Statistical Crash Analysis
for Automated Root Cause Explanation. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 20). USENIX Association, 235–252. https://www.usenix.org/
conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/blazytko
[10] Marcel Böhme, Van-Thuan Pham, and Abhik Roychoudhury. 2016. Coverage-
based Greybox Fuzzing As Markov Chain. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Vienna, Austria) (CCS ’16).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1032–1043. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978428
[11] Brian Caswell. [n.d.]. Cyber Grand Challenge Corpus. http://www.lungetech.
com/cgc-corpus/.
[12] P. Chen and H. Chen. 2018. Angora: Efficient Fuzzing by Principled Search. In
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE Computer Society, Los
Alamitos, CA, USA, 711–725. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2018.00046
[13] N. Coppik, O. Schwahn, and N. Suri. 2019. MemFuzz: Using Memory Accesses to
Guide Fuzzing. In 2019 12th IEEE Conference on Software Testing, Validation and
Verification (ICST). 48–58. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICST.2019.00015
[14] B. Dolan-Gavitt, P. Hulin, E. Kirda, T. Leek, A. Mambretti, W. Robertson, F. Ulrich,
and R. Whelan. 2016. LAVA: Large-Scale Automated Vulnerability Addition. In
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 110–121. https://doi.org/10.
1109/SP.2016.15
[15] T. Dullien. 2020. Weird Machines, Exploitability, and Provable Unexploitability.
IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing 8, 2 (2020), 391–403.
[16] Vijay Ganesh, Tim Leek, and Martin C. Rinard. 2009. Taint-based directed
whitebox fuzzing. In 31st International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE
2009, May 16-24, 2009, Vancouver, Canada, Proceedings. IEEE, 474–484. https:
//doi.org/10.1109/ICSE.2009.5070546
[17] Patrice Godefroid, Adam Kiezun, and Michael Y. Levin. 2008. Grammar-based
whitebox fuzzing. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2008 Conference on Pro-
gramming Language Design and Implementation, Tucson, AZ, USA, June 7-13,
2008, Rajiv Gupta and Saman P. Amarasinghe (Eds.). ACM, 206–215. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/1375581.1375607
[18] Google. [n.d.]. FuzzBench. https://google.github.io/fuzzbench/. Accessed:
2020-05-02.
[19] Google. [n.d.]. Fuzzer Test Suite. https://github.com/google/fuzzer-test-suite.
Accessed: 2019-09-06.
[20] Google. [n.d.]. honggfuzz. http://honggfuzz.com/. Accessed: 2019-10-19.
[21] Gustavo Grieco, Martín Ceresa, and Pablo Buiras. 2016. QuickFuzz: an automatic
random fuzzer for common file formats. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Symposium on Haskell, Haskell 2016, Nara, Japan, September 22-23, 2016, Geoffrey
Mainland (Ed.). ACM, 13–20. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976002.2976017
[22] Sumit Gulwani. 2010. Dimensions in Program Synthesis. In Proceedings of the 12th
International ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles and Practice of Declarative
Programming (Hagenberg, Austria) (PPDP âĂŹ10). Association for ComputingMa-
chinery, New York, NY, USA, 13âĂŞ24. https://doi.org/10.1145/1836089.1836091
[23] Maurice H. Halstead. 1977. Elements of Software Science (Operating and Program-
ming Systems Series). Elsevier Science Inc., USA.
[24] John L. Henning. 2000. SPEC CPU2000: Measuring CPU Performance in the New
Millennium. Computer 33, 7 (July 2000), 28âĂŞ35. https://doi.org/10.1109/2.
869367
[25] Marc Heuse, Heiko Eissfeldt, and Dominik Maier. [n.d.]. AFL++. https://github.
com/vanhauser-thc/AFLplusplus/. Accessed: 2020-02-12.
[26] Kyriakos K. Ispoglou. 2020. FuzzGen: Automatic Fuzzer Generation. In Proceedings
of the USENIX Conference on Security Symposium.
[27] Edward L Kaplan and Paul Meier. 1958. Nonparametric estimation from incom-
plete observations. Journal of the American statistical association 53, 282 (1958),
457–481.
[28] V. Kashyap, J. Ruchti, L. Kot, E. Turetsky, R. Swords, S. A. Pan, J. Henry, D. Melski,
and E. Schulte. 2019. Automated Customized Bug-Benchmark Generation. In 2019
19th International Working Conference on Source Code Analysis and Manipulation
(SCAM). 103–114.
[29] George Klees, Andrew Ruef, Benji Cooper, Shiyi Wei, and Michael Hicks. 2018.
Evaluating Fuzz Testing. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (Toronto, Canada) (CCS ’18). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 2123–2138. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243804
[30] Caroline Lemieux and Koushik Sen. 2018. FairFuzz: a targeted mutation strategy
for increasing greybox fuzz testing coverage. In Proceedings of the 33rd ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2018, Montpellier,
France, September 3-7, 2018, Marianne Huchard, Christian Kästner, and Gordon
Fraser (Eds.). ACM, 475–485. https://doi.org/10.1145/3238147.3238176
[31] LLVM Foundation. [n.d.]. libFuzzer. https://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html. Ac-
cessed: 2019-09-06.
[32] Shan Lu, Zhenmin Li, Feng Qin, Lin Tan, Pin Zhou, and Yuanyuan Zhou. 2005.
Bugbench: Benchmarks for evaluating bug detection tools. In In Workshop on the
Evaluation of Software Defect Detection Tools.
[33] Chenyang Lyu, Shouling Ji, Chao Zhang, Yuwei Li, Wei-Han Lee, Yu Song, and
Raheem Beyah. 2019. MOPT: Optimized Mutation Scheduling for Fuzzers. In 28th
USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2019, Santa Clara, CA, USA, August
14-16, 2019., Nadia Heninger and Patrick Traynor (Eds.). USENIX Association,
1949–1966. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/
lyu
[34] Valentin J. M. Manès, HyungSeok Han, Choongwoo Han, Sang Kil Cha, Manuel
Egele, Edward J. Schwartz, and Maverick Woo. 2019. The Art, Science, and
Engineering of Fuzzing: A Survey. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
(2019). https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2019.2946563
[35] T. J. McCabe. 1976. A Complexity Measure. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 2, 4 (July
1976), 308–âĂŞ320. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.1976.233837
[36] MITRE. 2007. Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). https://cwe.mitre.org/.
[37] Peach Tech. [n.d.]. Peach Fuzzer Platform. https://www.peach.tech/products/
peach-fuzzer/peach-platform/. Accessed: 2019-09-09.
[38] H. Peng, Y. Shoshitaishvili, and M. Payer. 2018. T-Fuzz: Fuzzing by Program
Transformation. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 697–710.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2018.00056
[39] T. Petsios, A. Tang, S. Stolfo, A. D. Keromytis, and S. Jana. 2017. NEZHA: Efficient
Domain-Independent Differential Testing. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP). 615–632. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.27
[40] Theofilos Petsios, Jason Zhao, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Suman Jana. 2017.
SlowFuzz: Automated Domain-Independent Detection of Algorithmic Complexity
Vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (Dallas, Texas, USA) (CCS ’17). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 2155–2168. https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134073
[41] Van-Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, and Abhik Roychoudhury. 2016. Model-based
whitebox fuzzing for program binaries. In Proceedings of the 31st IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2016, Singapore,
September 3-7, 2016, David Lo, Sven Apel, and Sarfraz Khurshid (Eds.). ACM,
543–553. https://doi.org/10.1145/2970276.2970316
[42] Sebastian Poeplau and Aurélien Francillon. 2020. Symbolic execution with
SymCC: Don’t interpret, compile!. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 20). USENIX Association, 181–198. https://www.usenix.org/conference/
usenixsecurity20/presentation/poeplau
[43] Aleksandar Prokopec, Andrea Rosà, David Leopoldseder, Gilles Duboscq, Petr
Tůma, Martin Studener, Lubomír Bulej, Yudi Zheng, Alex Villazón, Doug Simon,
Thomas Würthinger, and Walter Binder. 2019. Renaissance: Benchmarking Suite
for Parallel Applications on the JVM. In Proceedings of the 40th ACM SIGPLAN
Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (Phoenix, AZ,
USA) (PLDI 2019). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA,
31âĂŞ47. https://doi.org/10.1145/3314221.3314637
[44] Tim Rains. 2012. Security Development Lifecycle: A Living Process.
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2012/02/01/security-development-
lifecycle-a-living-process/. Accessed: 2019-09-09.
[45] Subhajit Roy, Awanish Pandey, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Yu Hu. 2018. Bug
Synthesis: Challenging Bug-Finding Tools with Deep Faults. In Proceedings of
the 2018 26th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference
and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering (Lake Buena Vista,
Ahmad Hazimeh, Adrian Herrera, and Mathias Payer
FL, USA) (ESEC/FSE 2018). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY,
USA, 224âĂŞ234. https://doi.org/10.1145/3236024.3236084
[46] Konstantin Serebryany, Derek Bruening, Alexander Potapenko, and Dmitriy
Vyukov. 2012. AddressSanitizer: A Fast Address Sanity Checker. In 2012 USENIX
Annual Technical Conference, Boston, MA, USA, June 13-15, 2012, Gernot Heiser
and Wilson C. Hsieh (Eds.). USENIX Association, 309–318. https://www.usenix.
org/conference/atc12/technical-sessions/presentation/serebryany
[47] Yan Shoshitaishvili, RuoyuWang, Christopher Salls, Nick Stephens, Mario Polino,
Audrey Dutcher, John Grosen, Siji Feng, Christophe Hauser, Christopher Kruegel,
and Giovanni Vigna. 2016. SoK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques
in Binary Analysis. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[48] D. Song, J. Lettner, P. Rajasekaran, Y. Na, S. Volckaert, P. Larsen, and M. Franz.
2019. SoK: Sanitizing for Security. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP). 1275–1295. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00010
[49] Daan Sprenkels. [n.d.]. LLVM provides no side-channel resistance. https://
dsprenkels.com/cmov-conversion.html. Accessed: 2020-02-13.
[50] Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation. [n.d.]. SPEC Benchmark Suite.
https://www.spec.org/. Accessed: 2020-02-12.
[51] Nick Stephens, John Grosen, Christopher Salls, Andrew Dutcher, Ruoyu Wang,
Jacopo Corbetta, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna.
2016. Driller: Augmenting Fuzzing Through Selective Symbolic Execution. In
23rd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2016,
San Diego, California, USA, February 21-24, 2016. The Internet Society. http:
//dx.doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2016.23368
[52] Jóakim v. Kistowski, Jeremy A. Arnold, Karl Huppler, Klaus-Dieter Lange, John L.
Henning, and Paul Cao. 2015. How to Build a Benchmark. In Proceedings of
the 6th ACM/SPEC International Conference on Performance Engineering (Austin,
Texas, USA) (ICPE âĂŹ15). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY,
USA, 333âĂŞ336. https://doi.org/10.1145/2668930.2688819
[53] Jonas Benedict Wagner. 2017. Elastic Program Transformations Automatically
Optimizing the Reliability/Performance Trade-off in Systems Software. (2017),
149. https://doi.org/10.5075/epfl-thesis-7745
[54] Junjie Wang, Bihuan Chen, Lei Wei, and Yang Liu. 2017. Skyfire: Data-Driven
Seed Generation for Fuzzing. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP 2017, San Jose, CA, USA, May 22-26, 2017. IEEE Computer Society, 579–594.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.23
[55] JunjieWang, BihuanChen, LeiWei, and Yang Liu. 2019. Superion: grammar-aware
greybox fuzzing. In Proceedings of the 41st International Conference on Software
Engineering, ICSE 2019, Montreal, QC, Canada, May 25-31, 2019, Joanne M. Atlee,
Tevfik Bultan, and Jon Whittle (Eds.). IEEE / ACM, 724–735. https://doi.org/10.
1109/ICSE.2019.00081
[56] Maverick Woo, Sang Kil Cha, Samantha Gottlieb, and David Brumley. 2013.
Scheduling black-box mutational fuzzing. In 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS’13, Berlin, Germany, November 4-8,
2013, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Virgil D. Gligor, and Moti Yung (Eds.). ACM, 511–522.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2508859.2516736
[57] Insu Yun, Sangho Lee, Meng Xu, Yeongjin Jang, and Taesoo Kim. 2018. QSYM: A
Practical Concolic Execution Engine Tailored for Hybrid Fuzzing. In Proceedings
of the 27th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (Baltimore, MD, USA)
(SEC’18). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 745–761. http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=3277203.3277260
[58] Michal Zalewski. [n.d.]. American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) Technical Whitepaper. http:
//lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/technical_details.txt. Accessed: 2019-09-06.
Magma: A Ground-Truth Fuzzing Benchmark
A BUGS AND REPORTS
Table A1: The bugs injected into Magma, and the original bug reports. Of the 118 bugs, 78 bugs (66 %) have a scope measure of
one. Althoughmost single-scope bugs can be ported with an automatic technique, relying on such a technique would produce
fewer and lower-quality canaries.
Bug ID Report Class PoV Scopes
lib
pn
g
AAH001 CVE-2018-13785 Integer overflow, divide by zero ✓ 1
AAH002 CVE-2019-7317 Use-after-free ✓ 4
AAH003 CVE-2015-8472 API inconsistency ✓ 2
AAH004 CVE-2015-0973 Integer overflow ✗ 1
AAH005 CVE-2014-9495 Integer overflow, Buffer overflow ✓ 1
AAH007 (Unspecified) Memory leak ✓ 2
AAH008 CVE-2013-6954 0-pointer dereference ✓ 2
lib
tiff
AAH009 CVE-2016-9535 Heap buffer overflow ✓ 1
AAH010 CVE-2016-5314 Heap buffer overflow ✓ 1
AAH011 CVE-2016-10266 Divide by zero ✗ 2
AAH012 CVE-2016-10267 Divide by zero ✗ 1
AAH013 CVE-2016-10269 OOB read ✓ 1
AAH014 CVE-2016-10269 OOB read ✓ 1
AAH015 CVE-2016-10270 OOB read ✓ 4
AAH016 CVE-2015-8784 Heap buffer overflow ✓ 1
AAH017 CVE-2019-7663 0-pointer dereference ✓ 1
AAH018 CVE-2018-8905 Heap buffer underflow ✓ 1
AAH019 CVE-2018-7456 OOB read ✗ 1
AAH020 CVE-2016-3658 Heap buffer overflow ✓ 2
AAH021 CVE-2018-18557 OOB write ✗ 2
AAH022 CVE-2017-11613 Resource Exhaustion ✓ 2
lib
xm
l2
AAH024 CVE-2017-9047 Stack buffer overflow ✓ 2
AAH025 CVE-2017-0663 Type confusion ✓ 1
AAH026 CVE-2017-7375 XML external entity ✓ 1
AAH027 CVE-2018-14567 Resource exhaustion ✗ 1
AAH028 CVE-2017-5130 Integer overflow, heap corruption ✗ 1
AAH029 CVE-2017-9048 Stack buffer overflow ✗ 2
AAH030 CVE-2017-8872 OOB read ✗ 2
AAH031 ISSUE #58 (gitlab) OOB read ✗ 1
AAH032 CVE-2015-8317 OOB read ✓ 2
AAH033 CVE-2016-4449 XML external entity ✗ 1
AAH034 CVE-2016-1834 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 2
AAH035 CVE-2016-1836 Use-after-free ✗ 2
AAH036 CVE-2016-1837 Use-after-free ✗ 1
AAH037 CVE-2016-1838 Heap buffer overread ✓ 2
AAH038 CVE-2016-1839 Heap buffer overread ✗ 1
AAH039 BUG 758518 Heap buffer overread ✗ 1
AAH040 CVE-2016-1840 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 1
AAH041 CVE-2016-1762 Heap buffer overread ✓ 1
po
pp
le
r
AAH042 CVE-2019-14494 Divide-by-zero ✓ 1
AAH043 CVE-2019-9959 Resource exhaustion (memory) ✓ 1
AAH045 CVE-2017-9865 Stack buffer overflow ✓ 4
AAH046 CVE-2019-10873 0-pointer dereference ✓ 2
AAH047 CVE-2019-12293 Heap buffer overread ✓ 1
AAH048 CVE-2019-10872 Heap buffer overflow ✓ 3
AAH049 CVE-2019-9200 Heap buffer underwrite ✓ 1
AAH050 Bug #106061 Divide-by-zero ✓ 1
AAH051 ossfuzz/8499 Integer overflow ✓ 1
AAH052 Bug #101366 0-pointer dereference ✓ 1
JCH201 CVE-2019-7310 Heap buffer overflow ✓ 1
JCH202 CVE-2018-21009 Integer overflow ✗ 1
JCH203 CVE-2018-20650 Type confusion ✗ 2
JCH204 CVE-2018-20481 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
JCH206 CVE-2018-19058 Type confusion ✗ 2
JCH207 CVE-2018-13988 OOB read ✓ 1
JCH208 CVE-2019-12360 Stack buffer overflow ✗ 1
JCH209 CVE-2018-10768 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
JCH210 CVE-2017-9776 Integer overflow ✗ 1
JCH211 CVE-2017-18267 Resource exhaustion (CPU) ✗ 1
JCH212 CVE-2017-14617 Divide-by-zero ✓ 1
JCH214 CVE-2019-12493 Stack buffer overread ✗ 3
Bug ID Report Class PoV Scopes
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AAH054 CVE-2016-2842 OOB write ✗ 5
AAH055 CVE-2016-2108 OOB read ✓ 5
AAH056 CVE-2016-6309 Use-after-free ✓ 1
AAH057 CVE-2016-2109 Resource exhaustion (memory) ✗ 2
AAH058 CVE-2016-2176 Stack buffer overread ✗ 2
AAH059 CVE-2016-6304 Resource exhaustion (memory) ✗ 3
MAE100 CVE-2016-2105 Integer overflow ✗ 1
MAE102 CVE-2016-6303 Integer overflow ✗ 1
MAE103 CVE-2017-3730 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
MAE104 CVE-2017-3735 OOB read ✓ 1
MAE105 CVE-2016-0797 Integer overflow ✗ 2
MAE106 CVE-2015-1790 0-pointer dereference ✗ 2
MAE107 CVE-2015-0288 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
MAE108 CVE-2015-0208 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
MAE109 CVE-2015-0286 Type confusion ✗ 1
MAE110 CVE-2015-0289 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
MAE111 CVE-2015-1788 Resource exhaustion (CPU) ✗ 1
MAE112 CVE-2016-7052 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
MAE113 CVE-2016-6308 Resource exhaustion (memory) ✗ 2
MAE114 CVE-2016-6305 Resource exhaustion (CPU) ✗ 1
MAE115 CVE-2016-6302 OOB read ✓ 1
sq
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JCH214 CVE-2019-9936 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 1
JCH215 CVE-2019-20218 Stack buffer overread ✓ 1
JCH216 CVE-2019-19923 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
JCH217 CVE-2019-19959 OOB read ✗ 1
JCH218 CVE-2019-19925 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
JCH219 CVE-2019-19244 OOB read ✗ 2
JCH220 CVE-2018-8740 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
JCH221 CVE-2017-15286 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
JCH222 CVE-2017-2520 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 2
JCH223 CVE-2017-2518 Use-after-free ✗ 1
JCH225 CVE-2017-10989 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 1
JCH226 CVE-2019-19646 Logical error ✓ 2
JCH227 CVE-2013-7443 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 1
JCH228 CVE-2019-19926 Logical error ✓ 1
JCH229 CVE-2019-19317 Resource exhaustion (memory) ✗ 1
JCH230 CVE-2015-3415 Double-free ✗ 1
JCH231 CVE-2020-9327 0-pointer dereference ✗ 3
JCH232 CVE-2015-3414 Uninitialized memory access ✓ 1
JCH233 CVE-2015-3416 Stack buffer overflow ✗ 1
JCH234 CVE-2019-19880 0-pointer dereference ✗ 1
ph
p
MAE002 CVE-2019-9021 Heap buffer overread ✗ 1
MAE004 CVE-2019-9641 Uninitialized memory access ✗ 1
MAE006 CVE-2019-11041 OOB read ✗ 1
MAE008 CVE-2019-11034 OOB read ✓ 1
MAE009 CVE-2019-11039 OOB read ✗ 1
MAE010 CVE-2019-11040 Heap buffer overflow ✗ 1
MAE011 CVE-2018-20783 OOB read ✗ 3
MAE012 CVE-2019-9022 OOB read ✗ 2
MAE014 CVE-2019-9638 Uninitialized memory access ✓ 1
MAE015 CVE-2019-9640 OOB read ✗ 2
MAE016 CVE-2018-14883 Heap buffer overread ✗ 2
MAE017 CVE-2018-7584 Stack buffer underread ✗ 1
MAE018 CVE-2017-11362 Stack buffer overflow ✗ 1
MAE019 CVE-2014-9912 OOB write ✗ 1
MAE020 CVE-2016-10159 Integer overflow ✗ 2
MAE021 CVE-2016-7414 OOB read ✗ 2
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TableA2:Meanbug survival times—bothReached andTriggered—in seconds,minutes, andhours. Bugs are sorted by “difficulty”
(mean times). The best performing fuzzer is highlighted in green (ties are not included).
hfuzz afl moptafl aflfast afl++ fairfuzz Mean
Bug ID R T R T R T R T R T R T R T
AAH003 10.00s 11.00s 5.00s 10.00s 5.00s 10.00s 5.00s 10.00s 5.00s 10.00s 5.00s 10.00s 5.83s 10.17s
AAH037 10.00s 10.00s 5.00s 15.00s 5.00s 16.00s 5.00s 15.00s 5.00s 38.50s 5.00s 15.00s 5.83s 18.25s
AAH041 10.00s 10.00s 10.00s 15.00s 10.00s 16.00s 10.00s 15.00s 10.00s 38.50s 10.00s 15.00s 10.00s 18.25s
JCH207 5.00s 4.42m 5.00s 2.05m 5.00s 2.93m 5.00s 1.60m 5.00s 1.43m 5.00s 1.42m 5.00s 2.31m
AAH056 10.00s 19.38m 10.00s 17.17m 10.00s 14.58m 10.00s 20.86m 10.00s 15.42m 10.00s 11.53m 10.00s 16.49m
MAE016 5.00s 10.00s 5.00s 3.97m 5.00s 4.42m 5.00s 4.93m 5.00s 5.97m 5.00s 2.21h 5.00s 25.38m
MAE008 10.00s 9.73h 10.00s 1.14m 10.00s 1.55m 10.00s 1.54m 10.00s 1.88m 10.00s 12.08h 10.00s 3.65h
AAH015 25.50s 2.83m 15.00m 6.01h 15.43m 5.28h 15.24m 2.80h 14.80m 8.40h 15.54m 46.22m 12.74m 3.88h
MAE014 10.00s 4.11h 10.00s 5.58m 10.00s 8.18m 10.00s 8.28m 10.00s 9.27m 10.00s 21.83h 10.00s 4.41h
AAH052 15.00s 38.27m 10.00s 3.94h 10.00s 2.18h 10.00s 10.56h 10.00s 2.06m 10.00s 14.38h 10.83s 5.29h
AAH032 5.00s 4.28m 10.00s 14.45h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 34.19m 10.00s 3.44h 10.00s 9.67h 9.17s 8.70h
JCH215 15.00s 40.97m 2.37h 15.67h 14.63m 10.74h 48.87m 11.51h 1.49h 7.02h 3.23h 9.86h 1.36h 9.25h
AAH020 5.00s 5.65h 5.00s 13.89h 5.00s 14.88h 5.00s 10.11h 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 3.12h 5.00s 11.94h
AAH022 26.00s 1.66h 15.00m 15.70h 15.43m 18.12h 15.24m 9.01h 14.80m 23.19h 15.54m 14.04h 12.74m 13.62h
JCH232 43.86m 1.66h 19.82h 19.82h 17.94h 17.94h 14.93h 17.21h 13.71h 17.05h 6.23h 10.31h 12.23h 14.00h
AAH055 10.00s 40.23m 10.00s 13.61h 10.00s 23.66h 10.00s 18.58h 10.00s 17.13h 10.00s 17.26h 10.00s 15.15h
AAH017 22.32h 22.32h 19.84h 19.84h 12.88h 12.88h 8.67h 9.20h 22.09h 22.09h 5.92h 5.92h 15.29h 15.38h
JCH201 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 16.82h 10.00s 12.54h 10.00s 12.98h 10.00s 14.89h 10.00s 14.02h 10.00s 15.88h
AAH008 10.00s 3.65h 10.00s 19.44h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 19.66h 10.00s 22.40h 10.00s 15.28h 10.00s 17.40h
AAH014 24.00h 24.00h 6.34h 6.34h 17.47h 17.47h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 18.46h 18.46h 19.04h 19.04h
AAH007 5.00s 57.00s 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 9.17s 20.00h
AAH045 13.50s 1.13h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 14.75s 20.19h
AAH013 4.05h 4.05h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 20.67h 20.67h
MAE115 10.00s 20.96h 10.00s 21.32h 10.00s 18.11h 10.00s 23.33h 10.00s 18.70h 10.00s 21.97h 10.00s 20.73h
AAH026 10.00s 7.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 21.17h
AAH024 15.00s 9.27h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.83s 21.55h
JCH226 4.09h 10.93h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 20.68h 21.82h
JCH228 2.47h 20.05h 22.57h 22.60h 17.14h 19.87h 24.00h 24.00h 15.00h 20.85h 18.78h 24.00h 16.66h 21.90h
MAE104 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 21.81h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 17.60h 10.00s 20.08h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 21.91h
AAH001 10.00s 17.70h 10.00s 22.60h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 22.72h
JCH212 15.00s 20.42h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 23.40h
AAH053 35.00s 21.80h 30.00s 24.00h 29.50s 24.00h 29.50s 24.00h 27.50s 24.00h 26.00s 24.00h 29.58s 23.63h
AAH025 22.48h 22.48h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 23.75h 23.75h
AAH048 10.00s 22.72h 15.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.50s 24.00h 12.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 11.25s 23.79h
AAH050 16.80h 23.71h 24.00h 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 6.80h 23.95h
AAH016 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 23.88h 23.88h 23.98h 23.98h
AAH054 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 24.00h 5.00s 24.00h
JCH202 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
Magma: A Ground-Truth Fuzzing Benchmark
Table A2: Mean bug survival times (cont.). None of these bugs were triggered by the six evaluated fuzzers.
hfuzz afl moptafl aflfast afl++ fairfuzz Mean
Bug ID R T R T R T R T R T R T R T
AAH005 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
AAH004 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
AAH011 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
MAE006 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
MAE004 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
MAE114 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
MAE105 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h
MAE111 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.50s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.08s 24.00h
AAH034 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 11.50s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.25s 24.00h
AAH029 15.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.83s 24.00h
AAH035 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 11.67s 24.00h
AAH059 10.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 12.50s 24.00h
JCH204 23.50s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 10.00s 24.00h 14.75s 24.00h
AAH049 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h
AAH031 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 34.50s 24.00h 15.00s 24.00h 18.25s 24.00h
MAE103 28.00s 24.00h 27.50s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 24.25s 24.00h
JCH210 24.50s 24.00h 30.00s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 28.00s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 26.25s 24.00h
JCH214 1.00m 24.00h 31.00s 24.00h 26.00s 24.00h 26.50s 24.00h 31.00s 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 33.25s 24.00h
AAH042 25.00s 24.00h 43.50s 24.00h 34.50s 24.00h 34.50s 24.00h 33.50s 24.00h 33.50s 24.00h 34.08s 24.00h
AAH051 30.50s 24.00h 19.32m 24.00h 12.72m 24.00h 14.16m 24.00h 11.91m 24.00h 12.32m 24.00h 11.82m 24.00h
JCH220 11.50s 24.00h 2.09h 24.00h 7.30h 24.00h 54.77m 24.00h 1.43h 24.00h 3.12h 24.00h 2.48h 24.00h
JCH229 16.00s 24.00h 2.80h 24.00h 7.44h 24.00h 1.07h 24.00h 1.68h 24.00h 3.23h 24.00h 2.70h 24.00h
AAH047 16.80h 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 2.81h 24.00h
AAH043 16.80h 24.00h 25.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 20.00s 24.00h 2.81h 24.00h
JCH230 22.50s 24.00h 3.31h 24.00h 8.88h 24.00h 1.36h 24.00h 2.62h 24.00h 3.56h 24.00h 3.29h 24.00h
JCH223 30.50s 24.00h 3.89h 24.00h 8.34h 24.00h 1.33h 24.00h 2.59h 24.00h 4.03h 24.00h 3.36h 24.00h
JCH231 36.00s 24.00h 3.96h 24.00h 8.35h 24.00h 1.41h 24.00h 3.24h 24.00h 4.05h 24.00h 3.50h 24.00h
JCH233 12.02m 24.00h 3.87h 24.00h 8.98h 24.00h 1.98h 24.00h 3.31h 24.00h 3.59h 24.00h 3.66h 24.00h
AAH018 1.12h 24.00h 12.45h 24.00h 12.68h 24.00h 7.71h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 4.03h 24.00h 10.33h 24.00h
JCH222 21.97m 24.00h 15.17h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 13.39h 24.00h 16.31h 24.00h 18.87h 24.00h 14.68h 24.00h
AAH010 24.00h 24.00h 6.34h 24.00h 17.47h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 23.85h 24.00h 19.94h 24.00h
AAH009 23.46h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 21.70h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 17.62h 24.00h 22.46h 24.00h
JCH227 20.58h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 23.43h 24.00h
JCH219 23.22h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 23.79h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 24.00h 23.83h 24.00h
